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Abstract: In states where Physician Assisted Dying (PAD) is legal, 
physicians occasionally receive requests for this form of end-of-life care. 
Here, I describe the ethically ambiguous sphere and why PAD falls into 
it. I argue that, given the ethical ambiguity of PAD, physicians should 
consider patient autonomy as the highest value in the four principles 
approach and act as informers and educators.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Physician Assisted Dying (PAD), or Physician Assisted Suicide 
(PAS), is legal in a few states. The most notable example of PAD 
legislation is in Oregon via the Death with Dignity Act of 1997. This act 
makes it legal for a physician to prescribe lethal medication to competent 
adult patients who have a terminal illness and are within six months of 
dying (Dahl and Levy 335-338; O'Brien, Madek, and Ferrera 329-365). In 
states where PAD is legal, doctors must decide how to respond to requests 
for more information on PAD. This decision can be difficult for three 
reasons: PAD is legal but not required, there is no agreement across society 
if PAD is ethical, and there is no consensus in the field of medical ethics 
about how doctors should respond. I argue that, for these three reasons, 
physicians in states where PAD is legal should honor patient autonomy by 
taking on the roles of informers and educators and by allowing the patients 
to decide which course of action they prefer.  




First, I will discuss a hypothetical case published in the AMA 
Journal of Ethics titled “Physicians’ Role in Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Discussions” (Johnston and Bascom). Second, I will introduce the ideals 
of the four principles approach: justice, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and 
autonomy (Beauchamp and Childress 417). Third, I will describe why a 
framework is needed to rank the four principles when two or more are in 
conflict. I will then describe three spheres of ethics: the unambiguously 
ethical, the unambiguously unethical, and the ethically ambiguous. In the 
following section, I will describe why PAD falls into the ethically 
ambiguous sphere. Next, I will describe why, given the ethical ambiguity 
of PAD, patient autonomy must be considered superior to maleficence, 
beneficence, and justice and why, in this sphere, doctors should take on 
the roles of informers and educators. I will then describe a probable 
objection and end with an analysis of what would have happened in the 
hypothetical case if Dr. Ferris had understood the relationship between the 
physician and the ethically ambiguous.  
CASE SUMMARY  
The AMA case presents a physician responding inadequately to a 
patient’s request for more information on PAD. In the case, Dr. Ferris’ 
patient asks to be prescribed life-ending medication. The patient, 
JohnathanWitlaw, is in the late stages of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
(ALS), a neurodegenerative disease. Mr. Witlaw only has a few months 
left to live, and during his final few weeks, he will likely experience a 
complete loss of mobility and the ability to communicate. Mr. Witlaw does 
not seem highly informed about the options available to him for end-of-
life care, but Mr. Witlaw gives a few arguments for the decision to end his 
life and says he believes that in his circumstance, the request is “a sane 
one” (Johnston and Bascom). The conversation ends awkwardly when Dr. 
Ferris tells Mr. Whitlaw that although he cannot argue with any of his 
points, he believes it is against his duty as a physician to prescribe 
medication to end his patients’ lives. Dr. Ferris should have begun by 
discussing other options for end of life care, and, if pressed, he should have 
directed Mr. Witlaw to someone else who could provide more information 
about PAD. Dr. Ferris failed to see the ethical ambiguity of PAD, and by 




refusing his request and stopping the conversation, he effectively forced 
his personal belief about PAD onto Mr. Witlaw. 
THE FOUR PRINCIPLES APPROACH  
To understand why Dr. Ferris should have taken on the role of an 
informer, I will begin with the four principles approach, one of the main 
ethical guides used in medical ethics (Gillon 307-312). It is based on the 
four principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice. 
Beneficence is the act of doing good for the patient, and non-maleficence 
is the act of not causing further harm to the patient. Autonomy is the 
freedom a patient has to make a decision based on whatever value he or 
she wants. Justice is the philosophical consideration of deserts, i.e. what is 
fair or what a person deserves. The four principles approach weighs each 
of these principles in order to form an ethical decision.  
The four principles approach is a common and well respected 
approach in medical ethics (Page 9-10). The four principles are useful as 
a starting point to develop an argument in medical ethics because of the 
generalizable nature of the principles, but problems arise when two or 
more of the principles are in apparent conflict with each other (Gillon 111-
116). For example, in the hypothetical case there is a conflict between 
nonmaleficence and autonomy. The physician’s desire not to cause 
physical harm to the patient is in conflict with the patient’s desire not to 
suffer at the end of his life. When the principles are in conflict with each 
other in this way, there must further clarification to allow the broad 
principles to be useful in a particular situation (Beauchamp 3-5). In this 
circumstance, I propose that they must be ranked, and a decision must be 
made based on the highest principle. As I will show in the next section, 
the four principles should be ranked differently depending on which 
sphere the ethical problem falls into. 
THREE SPHERES OF ETHICS 
In order to narrow down how one should use the four principles 
in this situation, I propose three loosely defined spheres of ethics: the 
unambiguously ethical, the unambiguously unethical, and the ethically 




ambiguous. Within each sphere, autonomy occupies a different role in the 
hierarchy of the four principles. Within the sphere of the unambiguously 
ethical or the unambiguously unethical, autonomy cannot be ranked at the 
top of the four principles. Take the ethically unambiguous situation of a 
minor suffering from a potentially life-threatening but curable bacterial 
infection. This case falls into the sphere of the ethically unambiguous 
because it is non-controversial to say that the child should immediately be 
prescribed the relevant antibiotics. In this simple case, neither the 
autonomy of the minor nor his or her parents’ autonomy is taken as the 
foremost value. Clearly both beneficence and justice outrank autonomy in 
this example and in other similarly intuitive examples. Healing the child 
and understanding that it is unfair to let a child suffer are more important 
than adhering to the subjective desires of the child or the parents.  
Within the sphere of the unambiguously unethical, autonomy 
should also not be taken as the foremost value. For example, take the case 
of a patient requesting opioids without any need for them. It is 
unambiguously unethical to prescribe opioids to a patient who does not 
need them because they are highly addictive and potentially lethal (Weiss 
and Rao 54). In this simple case, it is non-controversial to say that the 
patient’s autonomy is outranked by values of non-maleficence and justice.  
These two examples present situations that are unambiguous, 
either ethically or unethically. The spheres of the ethically unambiguous 
and unethically unambiguous are characterized by the agreement of 
society, medical ethics, and the law. In the example of the sick child, the 
intuitions of society, medical ethics, and the law all align. A physician is 
legally and ethically obligated by society and by the ethics of medicine to 
help the child (Harrison 99-114). In the example of the unambiguously 
unethical, public opinion, the field of medical ethics, and the law all agree 
that the harms to a society of loosely prescribing opioids outrank the 
autonomy of any one individual (King et al. 32). Both of these examples 
are in contrast to the sphere of the ethically ambiguous.  
Ethical questions in the sphere of the ethically ambiguous are 
characterized by ambiguity across three domains. First, they are 




ambiguous because they are legal but not required. Second, they are 
characterized by a lack of a societal consensus as determined by polls. 
Third, they are ambiguous because there is no clear consensus across the 
field of medical ethics on how a physician should behave. Doctors are 
often faced with navigating the sphere of the ethically ambiguous, and they 
must decide what to do when their preferred course of action is not what 
the patient wants. Take the example of a doctor whose patient refuses to 
receive a hip replacement despite the doctor’s belief that doing so would 
increase his or her quality of life. There is no legal imperative, societal 
imperative, or any consensus in the field of medical ethics requiring a 
doctor to perform this surgery (“American College” 19-34). Given these 
three qualifications, we can deduce that such a case falls into the sphere of 
the ethically ambiguous and that the patient’s autonomy outranks the other 
values. 
PAD is, at present, ethically ambiguous for the three 
aforementioned reasons: it is legal but not required, public opinion on 
PAD is split, and there is no clear consensus across the field of medical 
ethics. This analysis assumes the physician is in a state where PAD is legal, 
such as Oregon. National polls reveal that support for PAD has been split 
since the 1990s (Emanuel et al. 79-90; White III 247-257), and within the 
field of medical ethics, there is, at present, no clear consensus on how 
physicians should handle PAD requests (Emanuel et al. 79; Dickinson et 
al. 43-52). Given the ethical ambiguity of PAD, the physician should take 
the role of the informer and educator and leave the decision to the patient. 
The physician should rank the value of autonomy as chief among the four 
principles.  
PROBABLE OBJECTION 
Some have suggested that a problem with ranking autonomy 
above the other values in the four principles approach is that it leads to 
moral relativism (Gillon 307-312). For example, one could imagine 
making the claim that PAD for non-terminal patients is ethically analogous 
to PAD for terminal patients because they can both be justified by citing 
patient autonomy. However, a closer look at PAD for non-terminal 




patients reveals that it fails all three of the qualifications to be considered 
ethically ambiguous. It is illegal in every state in the United States (The 
Patients’ Rights Council), polling data indicate that most Americans 
condemn suicide by non-terminal patients as immoral (Rottman, Kelemen, 
and Young 217-226), and the field of medical ethics condemns this 
practice (Nunes and Rego). PAD for non-terminal patients falls into the 
category of the unambiguously unethical, and in this domain, autonomy 
cannot and should not outrank the other three values. Autonomy should 
not always be ranked as the highest value in medicine, but if it is limited 
to the sphere of the ethically ambiguous, it can help to navigate away from 
the other extreme of moral imperialism (i.e. situations where physicians 
force their opinions on patients) (Gillon 307-312). Further, autonomy is 
central to the practice of ethical medicine and plays a part in almost every 
common theory in modern medical ethics (Cook et al. 1615-1620; Taylor 
1-9). Any major critique of autonomy would therefore have to be 
significant in order to change the established role of autonomy in 
medicine.  
CONCLUSION 
In the case study previously mentioned, Dr. Ferris stops the 
conversation about PAD and effectively forces his belief about PAD on 
his patient. What Dr. Ferris has failed to realize is that PAD falls into the 
realm of the ethically ambiguous. The ethical ambiguity of PAD changes 
the ethical obligation of Dr. Ferris from informing his patient about the 
way forward to informing his patient about the possible ways forward. In 
other words, the autonomy of Mr. Witlaw is superior to the preferences of 
Dr. Ferris in the sphere of the ethically ambiguous. Dr. Ferris may voice 
his opinions about PAD, and he may even refer Mr. Witlaw to another 
physician, but he must ensure that that his patient’s autonomy is respected 
above other principles.  
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